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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
State~nent ofthe Case: As Defendants seem bent on answering a case they have made up 
initially in the District Court (that is, as opposed the actual case of the agency record), 
Plaintiffs restate their case for whatever reason that the Defendants' counsel does not 
hear. To wit: Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of Defendants' activities on 
Canlps Canyon Road (hereafter CCR) in the SENE Section 15 T39N R3WBM. 
Specifically, Plaintiffs claim Defendants' policies, customs, actions andlor failures to act 
on CCR work a deprivation of property-the envelopment of more of Plaintiffs' iand- 
without due process of law by denying Plaintiffs an opportunity to be heard in a 
meaningful way at a meaningful time. 
Plaintiffs have pled that Defendants have failed to circumscribe their broad 
authorities with statutory provisions of constitutional guarantees and remedies for 
erroneous deprivations. Their actions/failures to act, as manifestations of their 
decisions under their policieslcustoms of maintenance and improvement (widening, 
straightening, altering of CCR aidlor higl~ways presently existing at a lesser width); 
determination of Plaintiffs' alleged encroachment on the easement and repeated damages 
to Plaintiffs' fence; issuance of, continuation of, and/or failure to timely revoke the first 
Wagner driveway access pennit; and refusal to exhaust agency remedies, have oreiudiced 
Plaintiffs' property interests. 
Defendants have never acquired a legal "right of way" for their maintenance and 
improvement activities. 
Defendants' issuance of the first Wagner driveway access permit for trespass on 
Plaintiffs' land and the repeated damage of Plaintiffs' fence without notice of 
encroachment are unlawful. Although the Wagners voluntarily quit the first driveway 
access after the Rimrock survey showed it to be trespassing, the Defendants have 
continued their claimed riglit to issue driveway access permits for third parties across 
Plaintiffs' land under their claimed 50 foot "right of way". 
Defendants' have no authority or rational basis of a legitinlate governmental 
interest to regulate Plaintiffs' use of their land, save for the legally established 
jurisdiction of the easement, CCR. 
Plaintiffs assert that Defendants have violated Plaintiffs due process (substantive 
and procedural) and/or equal protection rights. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injulictive 
relief and the cessation of Defendants' invalid policies, custon~s and activities and the 
return of their wrongfully taken land. If the Court determines that Plaintiffs' 
constitutional rights have been violated, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs seek full common 
law damages to be determined by a jury. In the event that the Court deems that due 
process was adequately afforded Plaintiffs, they seek action under tort, inverse 
condemnation, trespass and/or nuisance. 
Defendants' maintenance and improvement activities, policies and/or customs are 
continuous and ongoing. Plaintiffs assert that the width of CCR is limited to the "surface 
of roadway" and was 15 feet wide in the SENE Section 15 T39N R3 WBM or less prior to 
the late fall of 2005 and is now 21 feet and growing. Further, due to the numerous 
alterations on CCR Defendants are unable to accurately locate any prescriptive claim and 
have i~itentionally destroyed the evidence of that claim-that which had bee11 used and 
maintained at the public expense ibr five years. 
At cross summary judgment, after a year of delay, harassment and obfuscatioli 
related to Defendants' claim to a prescriptive 50 foot-25 feet from centerline "right of 
way", Defendants reformulated their claim to a 50 foot "right of way". It was obviously 
not established by use and maintenance at the public expense for 5 years. Rather 
Defendants restated it to be a minimum 50 foot width mandated by Idaho law [I.C.§40- 
23121. 
Further, Defendants claim that their authority under I.C.§40-2312 absolves them 
of m y  duty or discretion: to follow any statutory provisions for Plaintiffs' constitutional 
guarantees (5"' and 14"' Amelldments US Constitution); to limit their jurisdiction to 
highways and public rights of way under I.C.§40-13 lO(1) (see Appellants Brief 
Addendum, pp. xvi-xvii) as set forth under I.C.5 40-202(3) (see Appellants Briej 
Addendum, pp. v-vi); or to allow Plaintiffs to exhaust agency remedies or to challenge 
commissioners decisions, conclusions, findings or inferences which prejudice Plaintiffs' 
property rights. 
Defendants have claimed Plaintiffs' fence encroaches on the "right of way" but 
have never served Plaintiffs notice and have repeatedly denied Plaintiffs a hearing 
regarding ellcroachment or validation of the legally established public rights in CCR. 
Plaintiffs have sought post deprivational bearings, formal and informal; validation of the 
legal establishment of the Defendants' claims of public rights in the easement, CCR in 
the SENE Section 15 T39N R3WBM; andlor evaluation of Defendants' actions under 
1.C.S 67-8003 (see Appellants BriefAddendum, pp. xxi-xxii). 
In a nutshell, Defendants state that their jurisdiction and their right to deny 
Plaintiffs' challenges to their jurisdiction rests under I.C.§40-2312. Plaintiffs assert that 
Defendants' jurisdiction rests in I.C.§40-202(3) and whether correct or incorrect, 
Plaintiffs' right to challenge Defendants' clailns rests with the 14"' Amendment of the US 
Constitution. 
At best, Defendants assertions under I.C.§40-23 12 are implying that the Idaho 
legislature has enacted an invalid statute and they were just following it and now simply 
seek an "advisory" opinion on their interpretations at the expense of Plaintiffs' time, 
money and effort. 
Statenlent of the Facts 
The undisputed material facts remain the same as in Appellant's Brief, at p. 15 L. 
1 I through p. 16, L.4. The disputed material facts also remain the same-the iocation, 
width, length and character of the easement of CCR which has been used and maintained 
at the public's expense remains disputed. See Appellant's Brief, at p. I6 L. 4 through p. 
16, L.7 
Plaintiffs reassert their depiction of the statement of the case and facts of the case 
in their Appellants ' Briefas being factually correct and an honest and undistorted 
portrayal, and point out Defendants' counsel's distortions of the facts as follows. 
PlaintifL~ 'Res~onse to Refindants' Facts 
To the extent that Respondents' Brieffails to state specifically where Respondents 
disagree with Appellants' Brief rendition of the facts of the case, and to the extent that the 
Respondents may intend to misconstrue any of the undisputed facts or to imply that some 
facts are not disputed, Plaintilts offer the following clarification of the facts of the 
Respondents' Brief (Respondents' Briej; pp. 6-1 1, pars 1 through 20). Plaintiffs will 
speak to each listed fact of Respondents' Brief: 
Facts #I and #3: Plaintiffs dispute any implication that CCR has been legally 
established as a "public road". Whether CCR is a "public highway" is a legal conclusion, 
based on substantial evidence and findings of hc t  in the agency record to support such a 
conclusion. Plaintiffs have requested and have not received any agency records of 
dedication of CCR to the public interest. Indeed, Defendants state no such dedication has 
taken place. Respondents' Brief misrepresents the Affidavit of Dan Carscallen. There is 
110 validity to the inference that Dan Carscallen made affiance that "Canlps Canyon Road 
was a public highway prior to adoption of the official mapn'. 
Fact 114: Terms such as "the same approximate centerline" are undefined, 
ambiguous and oxymoronic and have no probative value. Plaintiffs dispute any 
implication that CCR has not been altered in width and location since the late fall of 2005 
or in 1996. Mr. Hodge conducted no survey, and expressed no conlpetency or foundation 
for his evidence other than his reading of the aerial photos for which he brought forth no 
evidence that the photos were orthogonally rectified or comparable by scale or in any 
reliable way as evidence of or non movement of the centerline of CCR. Mr. Hodge does 
not state CCR has not been altered in location or width. 
Facts #5 and # l l ;  See also Statement of the Case: Plaintiffs assert that this case 
concerns all manners by which Defendants have exerted their governmesltal authority to 
tale and damage Plaintiffs' property-whether by improvement, maintenance, or 
issuance of driveway access permits. Plaintiffs dispute any implication that Plaintiffs' 
claims are restricted to or that "the only significant activities on Camps Canyon Road in 
the area of Halvorsons' real property are graveling, road grading a ~ d  snow plowing". 
Facts 116 and 1110: The average width of the "surface of the roadway" in the 
SENE Section 15 T39N R3WBM after the 2006 improvements is 21 feet and growing as 
testified to by the Defendants. The addition of width in the 2005-2006 widening of CCR 
in SENE Section 15 T39N R3WBM is 6 to 8 feet, leaving the width prior to the widening 
' R., Vol. IV, p. 642, par. 3 
process 13 to15 feet by Defendants' own admissions. Compare to Plaintiffs' Complaint 
(R., Vol. I, pp. 11, par. 8 ('111 1996 the usage width of the road was 10-12 feet before the 
alteration and was only 15 feet in a few places after the road had been moved) 
Defendants also state that they added 4feet to the NE side of CCR in 1996 in the vicinity 
of tlie 31-1- acre parcel n~alting thelr claim to the "surface of the roadway to be 1 I feet 
prior to 1996). The parties do not disagree on the width before the 2005 widening (1 5 
feet) or before the 1996 alterations (1 1 feet). The parties also do not disagree on the 
locatioll of the 2005 centerline of the road prior to the subsequent alterations in the 
narrowest part of Plaintiffs' burfer. Here the centerline was 15 feet from Plaintiffs' 
fence. As was previously stated the width of the used portion of the road was also 15 feet 
leaving 7 % feet from centerline of road usage and 7 % feet of buffer. Compare to 
Plaintiffs' testimony at R., Vol. V, p. 1095, L.13-22 ("5-10 feet of buffer was left in the 
narrowest part of the buffer). Plaintiffs dispute that the 6-8 feet of additional width of 
2005-2006 have not impacted on Plaintiffs' buffer and fence (R., Vol. VII, pp. 1374, 
1377, 1379, 1380, and 1381 (photos showing placement of dirt and gravel into Plaintiffs' 
buffer and onto Plaintiffs fence in 2006 and tlie plowing of snow onto Plaintiffs' fence 
beginni~ig ill the winter of 2006-7). These activities of maintenance and improvement 
have continued throughout the SENE Section 15 T39N R3WBM and throughout the 
course of this litigation. Further Plaintiffs continue to dispute Defendants' undocumented 
alterations of width and centerline locatioli of CCR since 2005. Plaintiffs have received 
no notice of encroachment of their fence or hearing, yet Mr. Payne testifies that 
Plaintiffs' fence is within tlie Defendants' right of way (R., Vol. V, pp. 858-59, 
Defendant Payne's Response to Second Interrogatories 28 ("To the extent that any dirt 
and gravel now lie on Plaintiffs' fence, such is a result of the Plaintiffs placing the fence 
within the NCLHD prescriptive right of way"). Defendants' Counsel states at cross 
summary judgment 3\3/09 that Plaintiffs' fence is encroaching on the NLCI-ID right of 
way (Tr., Vol. I, p. 13 1, L. 22 tlu'ough p. 132, L. 1 ("...amounts to an encroachment on 
the Highway District's right of way"). 
Facts #13, 1114, #15, #I6 and #I 7: Plaintiffs dispute any implied or inferred 
evidence by any Defendant that he did not have constructive laowledge that the 
centerline of CCR had not been altered from its earliest recorded history-the description 
of Plaintiffs' and the Wagners' deeds. 
(a) CCR forms the NE boundary of the 3+/- acre parcel (R., Vol. VI, p. 1149 
Wagner Deed description ("thence in a northwesterly direction.. .along the 
County Road.. .")). At cross summary judg~nent Defendants' counsel states 
incorrectly that CCR forms the east boundary of the 3+/- acre parcel. See Tr., 
Voi. I, p. 118, LL. 10-14 ("[alnd it's pursuant to this 191 1 deed, which in several 
places references its descriptio~l as bcing-the easterly description being the 
centerline of CCR"). The Defendants' shift of the compass point, whether 
intentional as to deceive or not, is obviously incorrect and of no probative value 
as it simply leads to obfuscation of the issues 
(b) Respondents' BrieJ p. 9, par. 13, Fact #13 ("Highway District Coreman 
Dan Payne met with Mr. Wagner who showed Mr. Payne a post next to the road 
wl~ich Mr. Wagner said represented his southern property line. of that post 
was an old driveway that used to lead to a home and outbuildings 011 Mr. 
Wagner's property. At least 50 feet further north of that driveway, Mr. Wagner 
had begun construction of a driveway which he wanted to be the locatioii for his 
approach permit. Mr. Payne approved his approach permit application for that 
location. Payile Second Affidavit, par. 6, R., Vol. VI, p. 121 1 ("fifty feet further 
north" of any post placed at the edge of CCR in the SENE Section 15 is whollv on 
Plaintiffs' land. Whether or not Mr. Payne shifts the compass point direction of 
the historic driveway intentionally, as to deceive-the historic driveway was 50 
feet to the west of Mr. Wagner's post and not 50 feet to the north of that post; Mr. 
Payne's description is implausible and of no probative value and only leads to 
obfuscation of the issues. Mr. Payne's statement is material only if the post was 
placed west of the 3+/- acre parcel's east property line as it is the east property 
line which was trespassed upon by the first Wagner driveway access permit. See 
R., Vol. VII, pp. 1383 (photo taken after Mr. Wagner "removed" the rocks from 
his first driveway and constructed a second; Mr. Wagner's post, at D, is next to 
CCR 50 feet east of the east property line, at B (as laid out by Rimrock 
Coi~sultants urvey), and which runs North and Soutl~). 
(c) Respondents' BrieJ p. 9, par. 14, Fact #14 ("Mr. Wagner told Mr. Payne 
that IIalvorson had complained that the driveway approach was on the 
Nalvorsons' real property., Mr. Payne reviewed Wagners' Deed to Wagners' real 
property, and verified by inspection that the approach for which the permit had 
been issued was located well within Wagner's property. Payne Second Affidavit, 
par. 7, R, Vol. VI, pp.1211-1212). Mr. Payne stated he physically inspected the 
permit location. Plaintiffs hold fee in all lands east of the east property line 
abutting to or underlying CCR in the SENE section 15. See R., Vol. V, p. 854, 
Defendant Payne's Response to Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories 18 ("Check it. 
If you [Mr. Wagner] are within the prescriptive right of way, your driveway 
access permit is oltay"). See R., Vol. V, p. 852, Defendant Payne's Response to 
Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories 12 (Dan Payne measurcd a distance of 699 feet 
along CCR, which measurement was part of Wagner's deed.. .Dan Payne 
determined based upon these observations that the location of the Wagners' first 
driveway was within Wagners' property"). Defendants' lmew or had constructive 
knowledge of the alterations in the centerline of CCR in 1996 (see Appellanls' 
RrieJ Statement of the Case) and the Wagner deed description was no longer 
accurate nor could the location of the east property line be determined by the 
location of the centerline of CCR at the time. See R., Vol. V, p. 793 Defendant 
Arneberg's Response to Plaintiffs' First Request for Admissions No. 27, subpart c 
16 (Defendant Arneberg admits that CCR has been moved-"minor movement"). 
Mr. Arneberg states minor movement means straightening of curves and widening 
of CCR (R., Vol. V, p. 867-868, Defendant Arneberg's Response to Plaintiffs' 
Second Interrogatories 16 ("Minor movement includes some straightening of 
curves and the widening of approxinlately 4 feet.. ."). 
(d) Respondenls' BrieJ p. 9, par. 14, Fact #15 ("Mr. Wagner told Mr. Payne 
that Halvorson had obtained a survey of the area and, based on that survey, that he 
wanted Mr. Wagner to move his driveway. Mr. Wagner filled out a new 
application and showed Mr. Payne the location, which was at least one hundred 
feet north of the original, permitted approach. Mr. Payne approved this second 
application on June 9, 2006. R, Vol. VI, pp.1215-1216 (Wagner 6/9/06 permit). 
Dan Payne revoked the first permit and threw it away as it was no longer valid. 
Payne Second Affidavit, par. 9, R, Vol. VI, p. 1212. What Mr. Payne states Mr. 
Wagner states is hearsay and is inadmissible. Mr. Wagner approached Plaintiff, 
Don Halvorson, seeking resolution to the obvious trespass after Rimrock 
Consultants drove the stakes for the survey. Plaintiffs informed Bob Wagner that 
they would cooperate with the Wagners in trying to resolve the matters with the 
NLCHD if he could get the Defendants to agree (R., Vol. VI, p. 1355, par. 15). 
Mr. Payne incorrectly states the direction of the second permitted approach-that 
is where the 2nd driveway accessed the road-relative to the first. Any access 100 
feet north of the first is wholly on Plaintiffs' land-100 feet north of the south 
side of CCR in the SENE Section 15 T39N R3 WBM is wholly on Plaintiffs' land 
and at least 50 feet north of any claimed 50 foot right of way, legally claimed or 
not (R., Vol. VI, p. 1156 (Amended Rimroclc Survey). Further, Defendant Payne 
had signed off on the Wagners' Latah County Building Permit (R., Vol. V, p. 
873) that valid road access had been obtained by the Wagners on 3/21/06. 
Whether Defendants were misstating the obvious compass direction, intelltionally 
or inadvertently, they provide no rational basis for their decision to either issue 
the first Wagner permit or to continue it or not revoke it. 
(e) Respondenl.~ ' BrieA p. 9, par. 14, Fact iil6 ("Mr. Wagner proceeded over 
the next weekend to construct the new driveway and he had the rock used in 
constructio~l of the first driveway pulled onto his property and filled in the cut that 
was made for the first driveway with soil. Payne Second Affidavit, par. 10, R, 
Vol. VI, pp. 1212"). There is no indication that Mr. Wagner agreed with the 
Defendants that his first driveway access was not wholly on Plaintiffs' land or 
that it was lawfully permitted. Nor is there any indication that the Wagners would 
construct a driveway access to CCR without a lawful permit. The Wagners 
obtained their 2"d permit on 6\9/06 (R., Vol. V, p. 875), a Friday. The NLCHD 
works 4-1 0 hour shifts in the summer, Monday through Thursday. The Wagners 
would have to have to gone out of their way and made special arrangements to 
obtain a permit that day. 
( Respondents ' Brie5 p. 9, par. 14, Fact # I  7 Defendants acknowledge that 
the issuance of the first Wagner driveway access permit was a matter of NI,CHD 
policy. The issuance of the permit was approved by the NLCIiD policy makers. 
See R., Vol. V, p. 880, Defendant Hailsen's Response to Plaintiffs' Second 
Interrogatories 24 ("Hansen believes that the first Wagner driveway access permit 
was lawfully issued"). 
Fact #18: Plaintiffs requested repeatedly that if the Defendants werc claiming 
public rights to a prescriptive, "public road", 50 foot-25 feet from centerline width as it 
was then located to validate the legal establishment of their claims under I.C.§40-203a 
under their own resolution. Plaintiffs filed Requests for Regulatory Taking Analysis 
under tlie IRTA. I'laintiffs repeatedly requested post deprivation hearings as the 
policies/customs of maintenance and improve~nent and determining of encroachments to 
CCR are ongoing and continuous. All attempts to resolve the issues were summarily 
refused by Defendants and denied applicability by Defendants' counsel (R., Vol. V, p. 
821-823 ("Landick said it was not the Highway District's responsibility to initiate the 
validation proceedings.. .there would be no official response to those filings [Plaintiffs' 
requests for Regulatory Talting Analysis] as they do not technically pertain to the 
proceedings. . . "). 
Procedurally 
At cross summary judgment Defendants dropped their factual claim-the 
prescriptive 50 foot width of CCR-and claimed the 50 foot width under statutory 
[LC.§40-23 121 authority (Tr. Vol. I, p. 114, starting at line 21 through p. 115, L 22) with 
the caveats that the "surface of the roadway" of CCR had been widened and the 
centerlme was located approximately the same as it was in 1974. 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction: 
There is no set of admissible niaterial facts which would release Defendants from 
liability in this case, as Defendants have not obtained a legally established "right of way" 
for their admitted to activities. Even their invalid claim of a 50 foot right of way 
mandated by law fails as a simple matter that it is located by the centerline of CCR which 
they admit to altering. As a matter of law, Plaintiffs have a valid 42 USC 5 1983 claim as 
Defendants, under the color of state law, have deprive Plaintiffs of their property interests 
without due process (procedural and substantive) andlor equal protection of the law. 
Defendants' Counsel stated his confusion with the issues of this case and 
complaints of the voluminous material (Respondents' Brief, at p. 12 LL. 10- 1 I). 
Plaintiffs assert that his complaints are a direct result of his failure to bring forth an 
accurate factual foundation and a plausible legal analysis of the problelns the Plaintiffs 
face with their specific situation on CCR-the continual invasions of their land without a 
legally established "right of way" and without allowing Plaintiffs an opportunity to 
challenge the Defendants' decisions in a meaningful way at a meaningful time. The 
volume of material in this case is a result of Defendants' counsel trying lo circumvent the 
issues rather than deal with them. 
This is a simple matter of Defendants making alterations to an unrecorded 
prescriptive easement without first obtaining a legal "right of way". Compounding and 
complicating this matter is Defendants' refusal to allow Plaintiffs to challenge their 
discretionary and operational decisions concerning Plaintiffs' land and fence-property 
interests protected by the l4Ih Amendment by their deliberate indifference displayed by 
their refusal to exhaust agency remedies in deliberate indifference and callous disregard 
for the force of the law. 
Reply to Respondents' Brief: 
I. The Defendants, Defendants' counsel, and the District Court J u d ~ e  have wasted 
Plai~ltiffs' time, money, and effort. 
I.R.C.P. Rule l(a) reads in part as follows. 
. . .These rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and 
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding. 
I.R.C.P. Rule l(a). 
Not only is Defendants' motion for summary judgment without foundation or 
legal merit; it is too unreasonable to be considered plausible. It is beyond frivolous; it 
totally contradicts case law and itself-an utterance of something reasonable andlor a 
comn~unication o'any attempt at a coherent justiciable decision. It is inane. Anthony 
D'Amato, Leighton Professor of Law, Northwestern School of Law in Public Law and 
Legal Theory Research Paper Series, A Quick Primer on Logic and Rationality, offered 
insight into such contradictions, thusly. 
Gottlob Frege in 1879 provided an answer to the charge that the validation of 
logic involves circular reasoning. He said that the rules of logic "neither need nor 
admit of proof" because they are part of what it means to be rational. There is no 
sense in asking whethcr logic itself is justified, Frege claimed, because logic tells 
us what "justification" is. Frege's idea that logic is foundational for rational 
thought as well as for intelligible commu~iication was expressed in a quite 
different way by Strawson when he said that a man who contradicts himself "may 
have succeeded in exercising his vocal chords," but has not communicated with 
anyone: "He utters words, but does not say anything.". Accordingly, we could 
answer Judge Jones not by arguing that she is bound in some normative or moral 
sense to obey the rules of logic, but rather that if she chooses to violate those rules 
she has simply defeated her own attempt to communicate her decision to the 
parties and to the publ~c. Similarly, when a person deliberately utters an illogical 
string of words, our inward response is not that he's doing something immoral 
like lying but rather that he is wasting our time and insulting our intelligence. 
Id., at 8.2 3. The mathematician, Bertrand Russell, referred to such inane antics as simply 
"noise without meaningM4. 
In conclusion to his review cites .Gottlob Frege, The Foundations ofilrilhmetic 4 (2d 
ed. 1980). "[Wjhat are things independent of the reason?" he asked rhetorically, at 36; 
and P.F. Strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory 2 (1952). 
See also Russel's Paradox The set of all sets which are not elemelits of theniselves 
(which includes, and therefore does not, and therefore does include itself); as it appears in 
van Heijenoort's commentary at van Heijenoort 1967:124-125, "There is just one point 
where I have encountered a difficulty. You state (p. 17 [p. 23 above]) that a function too, 
can act as the indeterminate element. This I formerly believed, but now this view seems 
doubtful to me because of the following contradiction. Let w be the predicate: to be a 
predicate that cannot be predicated of itself. Can w be predicated of itself? From each 
answer its opposite flows. Therefore we must conclude that w is not a predicate. Likewise 
there is no class (as a totality) of those classes which, each taken as a totality, do not 
belong to themselves. From this I conclude that under certain circumstances a definable 
collection [Menge] does not form a totality. Jean van Heijenoort (1967,3rd printing 
1976), From Frege to Godel: A Source Book in Mathenzalical Logic, 1979-1931, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge MA. 
That contradiction [Russell's paradox] is extremely interesting. You can modify its 
form; some forms of modification are valid and some are not. I once had a form 
suggested to me which was not valid, namely the question whether the barber shaves 
himself or not. You can define the barber as "one who shaves all those, and those only, 
who do not shave themselves." The question is, does the barber shave himself? In this 
form the contradiction is not very difficult to solve. But in our previous form I think it is 
clear that you can only get around it by observing that the whole question whether a class 
is or is not a member of itself is nonsense, i.e. that no class either is or is not a member of 
I'laintiffs will outline their assertions why such a simple matter as a two step 
analysis of Plaintiffs' 42 USC $1983 action for due process (procedural and substantive) 
and equal protection of the law has become a co~lvoluted voluminous mess. The crux of 
the mess rests with Defendants' counsel's failure to bring forth any cogent legal analysis 
of the issues-he arbitrarily bases Defendants' claims of public rights to a 50 foot-25 feet 
from centerline "right of way" solely on an invalid interpretation of I.C. $ 40-23 12. The 
volumes of material5 speak to the weakness of the Defendants' claim that I.C. $ 40-23 12 
sustains their burden of proof of their jurisdiction and counsel's evasive techniques to 
avoid a simple legal analysis of the problem. Where it may take a few pages of paper to 
state Plaintiffs' case that they have a right to challenge Defendants decisions, 
co~~clusions, findings and inferences as their actioi~slfailures to act have prejudiced 
Plaintiffs' property rights protected by the 14"' Amendment of the US Constitution; it 
takes a forest of trees to answer Defendants' childish antics of maneuvering to 
circumvent the problems Plaintiffs face on CCR-how to stop Defendants continued 
onslaughts on Plaintiffs' land and fence 
These volumes of material represent the extent to which Defendants' counsel will 
go to avoid the examination of Defendants' clai~~~s-the validity of the legally established 
public rights in CCR under I.C. $ 40-23 12. It is this very avoidance which has 
necessitated this matter to be a federal case. And even at this late date, Defendants' 
counsel would rather distort the facts than settle the matters on their legal merits- 
itself, and that it is not even true to say that, because the whole form of words is just 
noise without meaning. Bertrand Russell, The Philosophy of Logical Atomism 
2500 years ago Plato did place a inoral judgment on activities such as displayed by 
Defendants and their counsel by saying the good need no rules to act responsibly and the 
bad will simply look for a way around the rules. 
whether Defendants have a lawful claim to public right in a 50 foot-25 feet from 
centerline adjudicated by I.C.§40-23 12. The District Court has erroneously granted 
Defendants summary judgment on all Plaintiffs' Complaint based on a short phrase, "[a]ll 
highways ... shall not be less than 50 (fifty) feet wide, except those of a lesser width 
presently existing . .", wh~ch does not adjudicate public rights to a "right oi'way" 
Whereas, Idaho law allows for the lawful taking of private property for a "right of 
way", Defendants have not circumscribed their broad authorities to do so with statutory 
provisions containing constitutio~~alguarantees or with statutory provisions for erroneous 
deprivations 
Plaintiffs have presented a simple two step analysis for their claims, as outlined in 
Maresh v Slate ofl&o, Dept. ofHealth aizd Welfare, 132 Idaho22 1, 970 P.2d 14 
(1999). The matter is simple and straight forward. Plaintiffs have protected property 
rights in their land and fence. In Loretto v. Telepvompier Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 
U.S. 419 (1982) the IJS Supreme Court states that Plaintiffs have a right to expect to be 
relatively undisturbed by Defendants and when Defendants allow a third party to invade 
Plaintiffs' land it is particularly egregious. 
As 458 U. S. supra, indicates, property law has long protected an owner's 
expectation that he will be relatively undisturbed at least in the possession of his 
property. To require, as well, that the owner permit another to exercise complete 
dominion literally adds insult to illjury. See Michelman, Property, Utility, and 
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 
13arv.L.Rev. 1165, 1228, and n. 110 (1967). Furthermore, such an occupation is 
qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a 
regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may 
have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion. 
Id., at 435-436 (1982). 
In comparison, Plaintiffs will reply to Defendants' convoluted and unreasonable 
case. 
11. Plaintiffs' Complaint 
Plaintiffs brought forth action under 42 USC 5 1983 as Defendants, under the 
color of state law, in their individual and in their official capacities, have deprived 
Plaintiffs of their property and liberty rights without due process (procedural and 
substantive) and equal protection of the law without a rational basis of a legitimate 
government interest to do so. In the alternative Plaintiffs seek action under tort, trespass, 
nuisance, and/or inverse condemnation. The 2'Id Judicial District of the State of Idaho has 
subject matter jurisdiction for 42 USC $1983, et seq. claims. See Howlett v. Rose, 496 
U.S. 356 (1990). 
A. Standard of Review: 
A final decision or order of the district court on judicial review of an agency 
decision is appealable as a matter of right. I . .  1 In a subsequent appeal 
from a district court's decision in which the district court was acting in its 
appellate capacity under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Supreme 
Court reviews the agency record independently of the district Court's decision. 
Floyd v. Board ofcorn 'rs ofBonneville County, 137 Idaho 7 18, 52 P.3d 863 
(2002). Decisions made by a board of county or highway district commissioners 
in an abandonment, vacation or validation proceeding are subject to judicial 
review pursuant to I.C.5 40-208. In such a case, the review is conducted by the 
court without a jury and is confined to the record. I.C.5 40-208(6). The court 
may also not substitute its judgment for that of the Co~nmissioners as to the 
weight of the information on questions of fact. 
. . .  The Court may affirm the decision of the commissioners or remand the 
case for further proceedings. The Court may also reverse or modify the decision 
if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the 
commissioners' findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: 
(a) In violatioll of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) In excess of the statutory authority of the commissioners; 
(c) Made upon unlawful procedure; 
(d) Affected by other error of law; 
(e) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial 
information on the whole record; or 
( 0  Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or 
clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. 
Homestead Farms, Inc, v. B 'rd of County Comm 'rs of Teton County, 14 1 Idaho 855, 858- 
Where opposing parties both move for summary judgment based on the same 
evidentiary facts and on the same theories and issues, the parties effectively 
stipulate that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Riverside Dev. Co. v. 
Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515,650 P.2d 657 (1982). Summary judgment is appropriate 
only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the case can be decided 
as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c); Moss v. Mid-American Fire and Marine Ins. 
Co., 103 Idaho 298,302, 647 P.2d 754,758 (1982). The construction and 
application of a legislative act are pure questions of law as to which the Supreme 
Court exercises free review. Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Van Tine, 132 Idaho 902, 
980 P.2d 566 (1999). 
Roeder Holdings, LLC v. Board of Equalization ofAda County, 136 Idaho 809,8 12,4 1 
P.3d 237,240 (2001). In response to a motio~l for summary judgment, the opposing party 
must set forth "specific facts" showing a genuine issue. I.R.C.P. 45(e). See Verbillis v. 
Dependable Appliance Co, 107 Idaho 335,337,689 P.2d 227,229 (Ct. App. 1984) 
B. Defendants, under the color of state law, have deprived Plaintiffs of their 
property witllout due process (substantive and procedural) of law and equal 
treatment of the law; Plaintiffs have a right to challenge Defendants' final decisions 
which prejudice their substantial rights. In Maresh v. State ofldaho, Dept. ofHealth 
and Welfare, 132 Idal~o221,970 P.2d 14 (1999) the Idaho Supreme Court outlined the 
steps to determine whether a plaint if?'^ 14"' Amendment constitutional guarantees have 
been violated 
To determine whether an individual's due process rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment have been violated, a court must engage in a two-step analysis. It 
must first decide whether the individual's threatened interest is a liberty or 
property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment" Schevers v. State, 129 Idaho 
573, 575,930 P.2d 603,605 (1996) (citing Smith v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. 
No.2, 128 Idaho 714, 722, 918 P.2d 583,591 (1966). 
Id. at 226, 970 P.2d, at 19. As Maresh states the first step of the two step analysis is to 
determine if Plaintiffs have property rights covered by the 14" Amendment. 
1. Plaintiffs' land and fence are property rights protected by the 14"' 
Amendment. 
The United States Supreme court has noted that property interests are 
"created.. .by existing rules,. ..such as slate law." Id Likewise, this Court has 
indicated that "determination of whether a particular right or privilege is a 
property interest is a matter of state law." Ferguson v. Bd. ofTrustees ofBonner 
Cly. Sch., 98 Idaho 359, 564 P.2d 971,975 (1977) (citing Bishop v., Wood, 426 
U.S. 35 1,96 S.Ct. 2074,48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976)). 
Id. at 226, 970 P.2d, at 19. 
In Idaho, real property includes land, possessor's rights to land, ditch and water 
rights, mining claims (lode and placer), and free standing timber. See 1.C $555-101, and 
63-108. In Hughes v. State, 80 Idaho 286,293-296,328 P.2d 397,400-402 (1958) the 
Idaho Supreme Court held that private property of all classifications is protected under 
the Idaho Constitution just compensation clause. Plaintiffs' deed, instrument No. 42441 1 
(R, Vol. VI, p. 1150-1 15 l), Latah County, Idaho, provides substantial evidence for the 
factual finding to support the conclusion that Plaintiffs have a constitutionally protected 
right created by state laws. Plaintiffs' deed description gives Plaintiffs fee title to all 
lands in the SENE Section 15 T39N R3 WBM except for the 3+/- acre parcel with its NE 
boundary being the centerline of CCR. Plaintiffs ]lave a lawful fence. See LC. Title 35. 
Plaintiffs' property rights are indisputable. 
2. Defendants' jurisdiction is limited to what has been used and maintained 
at the public expense for five years-the "surface area of the roadwayn-15 feet; as 
located prior to the late fall of 2005; as determined by a jury. Defendants jurisdiction 
is found under I.CS40-13 10(1) ("The commissioners of a highway district have exclusive 
general supervision and jurisdiction over all highways and public rights-of-way within 
their highway system,. . ."). What is part of the highway system, highways and public 
rights of way, is found under I.C.§40-202(3) (see Appellants' Brief; Addendum, at iv) 
Plaintiffs have not said I.C$40-202(3) is unconstitutional (see Respondenls ' Briej 
at 23, LL. 8-16). As unainbiguously read I.C$$40-202(3), 605, 1310(1), 2312,23 17, 
2319, 5-224, 203 are not in conflict with I.C§§40-202(3). The Annotated Idaho Code 
540-2312 reads as follows. 
Width of highways established by prescription or public use had to be determined 
from a consideration of circumsta~lces ueculiar to each case, and was presumed to 
be 50 feet, unless facts clearly indicated that owner limited width of said road 
prior to time it became a highway by user. Meservey v Gulliford, 14 Idaho 133, 
93 P.780 (1908). Collateral References: 39 Am Jur 2d Iiighways, streets and 
bridges $5 51-55. 
Idaho Code 3 40-23 12 Highways by prescription (emphasis added). The evidence in this 
case-the agency record-is replete with Plaintiffs simply saying m t o  Defendants 
intrusions into their land "prior to time it became a highway by usern-since the late fall 
of 2005'. 
3. Defendants have deprived Plaintiffs o f  their property interests: The 
undisputed material evidence supports a conclusion that CCR has no "right of way" 
which has been located and recorded by order of a board of commissioners. The 
undisputed evidence is that Defendants admit to altering the width and location of 
E.g. Minutes from the NLCHD meeting 4/12/06, R., Vol. V, p. 842, LL. 8-24 (Plaintiff 
gave defendants fair warning that their activities on CCR were prohibited by law); 
Plaintiffs letter to the Defendants prior to the 3/21/07 NLCIiD meeting, R., Voi. V, p. 
806-814 (Plaintiffs describe the alterations and problems on CCR and ask Defendants to 
validate the public rights they were claiming); Minutes from the NLCIHD meeting 
8/8/2007, R., Vol. V, p. 839, LL. 29-41 (Defendants refuse to allow Plaintiffs to represent 
themselves as Plaintiffs would "not have to pay a lawyer"). Minutes from the NLCIiD 
meeting 9/12/2007, R., Vol. V, p. 823, LL. 2-36 and LL. 20-33 (Defendants refuse to 
respond to Plaintiffs' Requests for Regulatory Talcing Analysis and request that the 
com~nissioners validate the legally established public rights in CCR under their own 
resolution and tell Plaintiffs if they didn't want to pay $750 for a hearing that they should 
get a lawyer). 
CCR-that which was used and maintained at the public expense for five years prior to 
their alteration-both in 1996 and since 2005-2006 and that the public record (the 
Wagner and Plaintiffs' deed descriptions as compared to the Rimrock survey) shows 
CCR has been altered since its earliest beginnings. Further, Plaintiffs assert and 
Defendants testify that they are unable to accuately locate the centerline of CCR. 
Defendants' counsel, at cross summary judgment declared that it is difficult, if not 
impossible, for him to identify the identical strip of land or the centerline of CCR, 
whether the width of CCR is what has been used for a period of five (5) years, and have 
been worked and kept up at the expense of the public, or is 50 feet wide (the centerline of 
CCR being the identifying characteristic). 
I guess it could be argued that that centerline may not be the historic centerline, 
but it's darn close, by Mr. Payne's reckoning, If that widening was four feel on 
one side and four feet on another, then the centerline is dead center,. If we give 
an inference that the road had adjusted a foot or two when the gravel was laid on 
it, then we might have up to a foot of adjustment to make in terms of that 
centerline. But there's really no survey that would be able to disclose that. I 
mean, there's no way that anyone would ever be able to go out there; that we 
could just adjust that survey by up to a foot, should the Court infer that that -that 
that would be the most-or the best evidence of the centerline. 
Tr. Vol. I, p. 133, L. 21 through p. 134,1,. 9. Defendants have not only altered the 
"surface area of the roadway" but they also can't accurately identify what has been used 
and maintained at the public expense for five years. -
4. Alterations in width and location result in envelop~nent of more land. The 
Idaho Supreme Court has indicated that alterations of width andlor locations of an 
easement are envelopment of more land 
There is a difference, however, between the enlargement in the use permitted by 
the owner of the dominant estate and the enlargement of the physical dimensions 
of the easement. As this Court stated in Aztec Ltd, Ind V Creekside Investment 
Co., 100 Idaho 566, 569,602 P.2d 6, 67 (1979), "An increase in width does more 
than merely increase the burden upon the servient estate; it has the effect of 
enveloping additional land." 
Argosy Trust Through Its Trustee, Alan Andvews v. Wininger, 141 Idaho570, 573, 1 14 
P.3d 128, 131, (2005). See Bruce Byron Bedke v. Piclcett Ranch AndSheep Co., an Idaho 
Covporation, 143 Idaho 36, 39, 137 P.3d 423, 426 (2006) ("[tlhe same is true [enveloping 
additional land] with respect to the change in the location of an easement"). 
Defendants admitted that activities on CCR-&their maintenance 
ilnprovelnent activities since the late fall of 2005 and their issuance, continuation of, 
andlor failure to revoke the first Wagner Driveway access permit have resulted in the 
envelopment of more of Plaintiffs' land. The extensions of width at cross summary 
judgment exceeded 6-8 feet and are growing as Defendants have not abated the nuisance 
and continue their policies of maintenance and improvement based on I.C.$40-2312. The 
Wagners volul~tarily abated the first driveway access and applied for a second driveway. 
Defendants destroyed the permit. Defendants signed off on the Wagners' road access on 
their Latah Cou~ity building permit and continued their autllorization uninterrupted and 
continue to claim that they have the legal authority under their claimed easement to issue 
driveway access permits across Plaintiffs' land. Plaintiffs assert that Defendaxts don't 
have that authority even if they had a legal 50 foot-25 feet from centerline right of way 
existed 
The recording of a plat is equivalent to a deed in fee simple, but it is not a deed in 
fee simple: "While the acknowledgement and recording is equivalent to a deed in 
fee simple, it is not a deed in fee simple, and does not give the public the same 
right to sell or dispose of the same that a private party has to land for which he 
holds the title in fee simple." Shaw v. Johnson, 17 Idaho 676,682, 107 P.399, 
399-01 (1910). When land is dedicated as a street for public use, the landowner 
owns to the center of the street and the public acquires an easement, not a title in 
fee simple. Id. at 682-83, 107 P. at 400-01 (citing Idaho Rev. Code $ 3091 (1908) 
(current version with amendments at Idaho Code $ 55-309 (2002)). 
Neidev v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503,507,65 P.3d 525,529 (2003). The Highway District has 
no possessory rights to CCR. Defendants have not attempted to show the allowed 
invasion of Plaintiffs' land for the first Wagner driveway access permil to be for "public 
use". 
5. Defendants have violated Plaintiffs' constitutional rights-enveloped more 
of Plaintiffs' land and damaged Plaintiffs' property without due process (procedural 
and substantive) and equal protection of the law: 
See Zinermon v Buvch, 494 U S. 113, 125-27 (1990) (there are three kinds of $ 
1983 clainis that may be brought against the State under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). The Idaho State legislature has provided Defendants with 
statutory provisions containing constitutional guarantees to acquire any necessary "right 
of way" Defendants might need for their maintenance and improvement activities. See 
I.C.§§40-605 and 1310, Title 40-Chapter 20, Title 7-Chapter 7 (Eminent Domain), 
a~nongst others. The activities of altering a highway and issuing, continuing andlor not 
revoking driveway access permits are discretionary and are "not unauthorized" and a time 
for a notice and hearing are predictable and foreseeable when the agency plans its 
maintenance and improvenlent activities or when Plaintiffs arrive at the NLCHD meeting 
to colnplain of Defendants' operating out of their jurisdiction. See Zinermon, at 132-1 39 
(post deprivation remedy is not adequate when the activity is foreseeable, predictable and 
"not unauthorized"). Defendants have unlawfully taken Plaintiffs' land and continue to 
do so. Damage of Plaintiffs' fence without prior notice of encroachment is proscribed by 
law as is the issuance, continuation of and failure to revoke the trespass of the first 
Wagner driveway access permit. The undisputed evidence shows Plaintiffs having given 
Defendants fair warning repeatedly of the invasion of Plaintiffs' buffer and damages to 
their fence and Defendants justifying their actions on grounds that the fence was within 
the "right of way" while refusing to give Plaintiffs a notice of encroachment, refusing to 
allow Plaintiffs an opportunity to speak in a meaningful way at a meaningful time, and 
refusing to validate the Defendants' claimed "right of way" or evaluate their actions for 
possible due process violations under Plaintiffs' submittal of Requests for Regulatory 
Taking Analysis under I.C.967-8003 
Plaintiffs assert that Defendants' policieslcustoms based solely on their 
interpretation of I.C.940-2312 are invalid; system wide (facially invalid) in the NLCHD 
or as applied to Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' specific situation in relation to CCR in the SENE 
Section 15 T39NR3 WBM. In the case ofthe latter, as applied, Plaintiffs assert that 
Defendants have supplied no rational basis of a legitimate govern~nental interest to treat 
Plaintiffs differently than similarly situated persons. Further the violation Plaintiffs assert 
is a violation of the "Bill of Rightsm-the 5"' Amendment to the US Constitution, and 
requires strict scrutiny. 
Our cases have recognized successful equal protection clai~ns brought by a "class 
of one," where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated 
differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the 
difference in treatment. See Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dalcota County, 260 U .  S. 
441 (1923); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Commission ofwehster Cty ,  488 
U. S. 336 (1989). 
Village o f  Willowbrook v. Olech. 528 U.S. 562 (2000). 
6. Plaintiffs seek the return of their wrongfully taken lands, a permanent 
injunction preventing Defendants intrusions into their land and the cessation of 
Defendants' invalid policies, facially and/or as applied to Plaintiffs in their specific 
situation relating to CCR, and full common law damages to be determined by a jury 
with sanctions against the Defendants for spoliation of the evidence of the location 
and width of CCR and preparing affidavits in bad faith and the right to amend 
Plaintiffss' Complaint with further damages and involved parties if necessary. 
Inverse condemnation is unavailable when no due process has been given. Plaintiffs seek 
the return of their wro~igfully taken land and a permanent injunction against Defendants' 
invalid policies/custo~ns. 
The Clause expressly requires compensation where government takes private 
property "for public use." It does not bar government from interfering with 
property rights, but rather requires compensation "in the event of otherwise proper 
interference amounting to a taking." First English Evangelical Lutheran Church, 
482 U. S., at 315 (emphasis added). Conversely, if a govermnent action is found 
to be i~nperrnissible - for instance because it fails to meet the "public use" 
requirement or is so arbitrary as to violate due process -that is the end of the 
inquiry. No amount of compensation can authorize such action. 
Lingle v. Chevron, USA Inc., 544 U.S. 528,543 (2005). 
11. Juxtaposed to Plaintiffs' Complaint is the Defendants' case and Judge Kenick's 
"adeptly organized" Opinion (Respondents ' Brief; at 12, par. A,). 
A. The District Court had no subject matter jurisdiction to grant 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment; Defendants failed to supply the District 
Court with subject matter jurisdiction for which they bore the burden of proof-a 
valid, legally established jurisdiction, easement for their "not unauthorized" 
activities under their policies/custorns based on I.C.940-2312; in the alternative, the 
District Court abused its discretion when it did not review the commissioners decisions of 
jurisdiction and validation of the legally established public rights in CCR and limit its 
review to the agency record or remand the validation back to the NLCWD. See I.CS40- 
208(6). Plaintiffs have a right to challenge Commissioners decisions, conclusions; 
findings, and inferences in final decisions under I.C.$$ 40-203a and202 prejudicing their 
substantial rights, property. 
Although there is no applicable standard of review previously articulated by the 
Court for such a situation, since I.C.$40-202 is contained in the section of the 
Code relating to general provisions for the establishment and maintenance of the 
state and county highway system, including procedures required for 
abandonment, vacation or validation of highways, it is logical that the statutorily 
mandated standard of review under I.C.$ 40-208 should apply to $40-202 
decisions. 
Honzestead Farms, Inc , at 858-59, 119 P.3d 630, at 633-634. See I.A.R. Rule 1 l(1). 
Plaintiffs sought and the Defendants denied Plaintiffs exhaustion of agency remedies. 
Action under 42 USC $1983 does not require exhaustion of agency remedies. Post 
deprivational due process, while may be adequate in some cases, exhaustion of agency 
remedies is not required. See Patsy v. Flovida Board of Regents 457 U.S. 496, 501 
(1982) (exhaustion of adlninistrative remedies is not a perquisite for seeking action under 
This Court has held generally the exhaustion doctrine implicates subject matter 
jurisdiction because a "district court does not acquire subject matter jurisdiction 
until all the administrative remedies have been exhausted". Fairway 
Development i i  Bannock County, 119 Idaho 121, 125, 804 P.2d 294,298 (1990). 
Owsley v. Idaho Industrial Commission, 141 Idaho 129, 135, 106 P.3d 455, 461 (2005). 
Plaintiffs assert that the District Court only gains subject matter jurisdiction of 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment if the factual question of Defendants' legally 
established public rights claimed by Defendants is true, as established in the agency and 
public record, in its entirety-i.e. CCR is a public highway, established by user to a 
minimuin 50 foot-25 feet fiom centerline width mandated by I.C$40-2312, The burden 
of proof is 011Defendants to show they have legally established the public rights they 
claim. 
The highway district has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that public rights were established. See Floyd, 137 Idaho at 724,52 P.3d 
at 869. 
Ada County Highway Dislrict v Total Success Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 365- 
B. Defendants have no reasonableness, foundation, or legal merit to their 
motion for summary judgment. The District Court's approach to Plaintiffs' Complaint 
is unreasonable. It has essentially said there are cases which contain Plaintiffs' 14"' 
Amendment protections (Maresh, supra) and cases which don't-Defendants' motion for 
summary judgment-and the District Court will only look at the latter. See Bertrand 
Russell Paradox, supra (such maneuvers are si~nply "noise"). Plaintiffs' property rights 
can not be taken by reducing due process to a tautology under state law 
The point is straightforward: the Due Process Clause provides that certain 
substantive rights -- life, liberty, and property -- cannot be deprived except 
pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures. The categories of substance and 
procedure are distinct. Were the rule otherwise, the Clause would be reduced to a 
mere tautology. "Property" cannot be defined by the procedures provided for its 
deprivation any more than can life or liberty. The right to due process "is 
conferred, not by legislative grace, hut by constitutional guarantee. While the 
legislature may elect not to confer a property interest in [public] employment, it 
may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once 
conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards. "Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, 
at 416 U. S. 167 (POWELL, J., concurring in part and concurring in result in 
part); see id. at 416 U. S. 185 (WI-IITE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
Cleveland Brd. OfEa! V: Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,541 (1985). Defendants have the 
burden of proof of a legally established easement. 
The degree of accuracy of Defendants' burden of proof is "minuteness". See The 
City ofCoeuv D' Alene v. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839,847, 136 P.3d 310,3 18, footnote n.5 
(2006) (the regulatory takings tests, expressed in Loretto (regulation approving of 
physical invasion, however minute, is a taking)). See also Roberts v. Swim, 117 Idaho 9, 
15,784 P.2d 339,345 (Ct. App. 1989) (An easement by prescription requires a showing 
by claimant of the line of travel without material change or variation). Plaintiffs assert 
the difference between "approximately the same" and minuteness is infinitely large and 
Defendants' actions require a degree of exactness which is unsustainable by their lack of 
accurate records. Their findings and conclusions are arbitrary and capricious. See 
Enterprise, Inc. v. Nampa City, 96 Idaho 734,536 Y.2d 729 (1975) (an action is arbitrary 
if it was done without a rational basis; if it was done in disregard of the facts and 
circumstances presented or without adequate determining principles). Defendants also 
have the evidentiary burden to show they have substantial evidence in the agency record 
to support their legal conclusions, i.e., that CCR is a public road 
Public Status of the roadway can be established by proof of regular maintena~ce 
and extensive public use. Citing Floyd v. Bd of Comln 'vs, 137 Idaho 71 8, 727, 52 
P.3d 863, 872. 
Ada County Highway District, at 365-66,179 P.3d 323,328-29. Defendants and the 
District Court share the burden that the court has subject matter jurisdiction for 
Defendants' Case-summary judgment based on Defendants' legally established 
easement. 
C. Defendants have not supplied material evidence, agency or public record, 
to either support their motion for summary judgment (that the CCR easement they 
claim is without dispute legally established) or to deny Plaintiffs' motion for partial 
summary judgment on the liability of Defendants in their individual and official 
capacities (that the CCR easement Defendants claim is without d i s~ute  legally 
established): The legal establishment of the width, location and length of what has been 
used and maintained at the public expense for five years prior to the late fall of 2005 is in 
hot dispute by Plaintiffs. Mr. Landeclc obfuscates the facts of this case. Whether 
intentional or simply careless, he misstates several facts, most notably: (i) the centerline 
of CCR "wliich remains the same since 1974"' as establishivig the midpoint of CCR, 
(Respondents ' BrieA p. 19 LL. 11-16) and (ii) Respondents ' BriefFact ii 3, at p. 6 
"...Camps Canyon Road was a public highway prior to adoption of the official map.. ." 
In both instances, Mr. La~ideck places an affidavit citation discolinected from what was 
said. In the former both Mr. Payne and Mr. Arneberg said the CCR centerline was 
"approximately the same". No Defendant has said that the CCR centerline is the same 
now as it was in 1974 or before the late fall of 2005. Any claim that the location, width, 
or length of CCR is unchanged over any five year period is not substantiated in the 
evidence and runs contrary to the record initially made in District Court, as well as in the 
agency record and the public record. I11 the latter, Mr. Carscallell made no reference to 
Camps Canyon Road becoming a public highway prior to it being put on the highway 
map even though citation to his affidavit appears at the end of the paragraph. 
Defeadatits' conclusions of law are arbitrary and capricious, illegal, or an abuse of 
their discretion. See Enterprise, supra. 
D. Plaintiffs assert that the District Court abused its discretion and/or erred in the 
following manners; when it defied the precedent set in Maresh and set the order of the 
T h e  word "approximate" appears in Mr. Payne's affidavit R., Vol., IV, p. 638, [par. 81. 
The word "approximate" appears in MrArneberg' Affidavit R., Vol., IV, p. 645, par. 8. 
The District Court in its Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial Summary 
Judgment and Defendants' Motion,for Summary Judgment, R., Vol. VII, p. 1463, L. 4-23 
briefly leaves out the word "approximate" for the purposes of ascertaining the location, 
width and length of CCR as a matter of 25 feet from centerline without citation of an 
affidavit. Both before and after this brief discussion Judge Kerrick returns the word 
"approximate" to the phrase with citation to an affidavit 
issues otl~erwise in this case8, as simply ended in a convoluted error-that Plaintiffs do 
not have property iliterests protected by the 14"' Amendment. The crux of the matter was 
Plaintiffs have a property right; not that CCR exists 
The District Court has simply said that behind "Door #I" lies Plaintiffs' property 
rights protected by the 14"' Amendment and behind "Door #2" lies Defendants claimed 
and unverified easement, so we will look behind "Door #2" knowing that there we will 
not find any of Plaintiffs property interests covered by the 14"' Amendment. See 
D'Amato and Bertrand Russell, supra. See also Cleveland Bud Of E d ,  supra. 
Defendants have only an easement across Plaintiffs' land and do not gain adverse 
possession of it. 
All the right acquired by the public is an easement in the land consisting in a right 
to pass over the same and keep the road in repair. The legal title to said land 
relnains in the owner of the adjoining land or the land over which the road runs. 
Meservey v Gullliford, 14 Idaho 133, 137,93 P. 780,783 (1908). The Highway District 
does not have title in fee simple to the easement. See also Neider, supra, at 26. 
Plaintiffs' property rights are created by state law. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 
U.S. 564, 569, 92 S.Ct. 2701,2705,33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). "Whether Judge ICerrick 
adeptly organized the Opinion.. .into 3 analytical pa~-ts"9 or Defendants' counsel did the 
Several issues are before this Court on summary judgment, with volu~ninous briefing 
filed in the matter. Due to the lengthy nature of the briefing presented to this Court, the 
issues will not be presented in the order of the parties' briefs. The Court will first address 
the issue which is the crux of this lawsuit, the fact that the roadway in question is a public 
highway established by public use. Based upon this uncontroverted fact, the width of 
Camps Canyon Road, as a public highway, can be determined based upon statutory 
authority. The remaining claims made by the Plaintiffs are resolved accordingly based 
upon the status of Camps Canyon Road. 
Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment and 
Defendants' Motionfor Sumnzary Judgment R., Vol. V11, p. 1457, Analysis. 
See Respondents' BrieJ at pp. 12-21. The three analytical parts are crafted to ignore 
Plaintiffs' Complaint-that they have property rights protected by the 14'" Amendment 
outcome is the same: as the District Court abused its discretion andlor erred when it made 
the following choices: 
1) it granted summary judgment and attorney fees to Defendants and/or 
denied Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment. There is no reasonableness 
or legal merit to Defendailts' motions and Plaiiltiffs have a right to challenge 
Commissioners' final decisions prejudicing Plaintiffs' property rights. See I.A.R. Rule 
1 l(f). See also Homestead Farms, Inc., supra. 1.C.340-23 12 does not adjudicate public 
rights. See Cleveland Brd ofEd, supra. 
(2) it concluded that the width of CCR could be determined by Plaintiffs' 
failure to establish that the width of the highway was limited to the "surface of the 
roadwayni0, as the burden of proof rests on Defendants that as a matter of agency andlor 
public record they have evidence to support a finding that CCR is more than what has 
been used and maintained by the public for five years. See I.C@40-13 lO(1) and 202(3). 
See Ada County Highway District, supra. 
3) it concluded that the legally established location, width, length of CCR 
could be determined by its present centerline; as Defendants have no accurate 
underlying and abutting to CCR, in the undeveloped land next to the surface area of the 
roadway. The 3 part analysis essential says Plaintiffs owe Defendants due process for the 
public possessory rights in CCR; whereas no such subject matter exists-Defendant did 
not file a counter claim and even if they did it would fail to bring forth a cognizable 
clain~. See Bertrand Russell at footnotes 4 and 5. There really is no valid argument-it 
is a jumble of words incoherently uttered. 
'O Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment and 
Defendants'Motion,for Summavy Judgment, R., Vol. VII, p. 1462, L. 25-28 (Plaintiffs 
have established no basis for this Court to conclude that there is an exception to the fifty 
foot minimum width.. ."); pp. 1462-63, LL. 29-3 ("[tlhe Plaintiffs fail to establish that the 
width of the highway easement is limited to the surface of the roadway.."); p. 1465, LL. 
4-9 ("[iln order to sustain an action against the Defendants for damage to their property, 
the Plaintiffs must set forth facts which establish that the Highway District' actioils 
occurred beyond the purview of the right of way.. ."). 
determination of its wl~ereabouts-"approximately the same" is insufficient for the 
necessary accuracy. See The Cify ofCoeur D '  Alene, supra. See also Roberts, supra. The 
District Court's "clarification""is without any evidentiary support that the centerline has 
remained the same since 1974. See 1.B. supra, Defendants must show there is no dispute 
of the legally established width, location, and length of CCR. See Respondents' BrzeJ; at 
p. 6, par. 4 (Payne and Arneberg affidavits stale "approximately the sane")12. The 
Rimrock survey shows change in the intersection of CCR and the east and west properly 
lines of the 3+1- acre parcel compared to the deed description 
[Ilt is well settled under Idaho law that any judgment determining the existence of 
an easement must also specify the character, width, length and location of the 
easement. 
Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767,774, 133 P.3d 1232, 1239 (2006). 
4) it determined that CCR was a public highwayt3, established by user, as 
there is no evidence of extensive public use of CCR (see Ada Couniy Highway District, 
supra) in the public or agency record to support such a conclusion and as "established by 
user" requires a factual determination of what actually has been used and maintained at 
the public expense for 5 years. Whether Plaintiffs choose to dispute that CCR is a public 
highwayiauthenticate the users' of the road credentials as either "public" or private is not 
" The District Court's "clarification" (R.. Vol. VII, o. 1463 LL. 14-18 ("for oumoses of . . . . 
clarificariou, 11ic cenlcrlinc of the nct~i+I surt'itie ofiht. ~.oad!\.a)~,\vhicli 113s sl.c!jUd rhc 
same-since 10J3. establishes rlw rnitlpoini ot'lhc titi! fi~or span. '1-hc fi i r ) ,  foot widrh 01' -. -. 
the roadway is easily ascertainable by measuring twenty five feet from centerline of the 
roadway to each side of the road") 
Mr. Hodge made no survey and has no foundation for his opinion. 
l 3  Opinion and Order on Plaint8~'  Motions,for Partial Summary Judgment and 
Defendants ' Motion for Summary .ludgment, R., Vol. VII, pp. 1457-1460, section A. par. 
1 "Camps Canyon Road is a public highway..."; p. 1463, L. 7-10 ("[tlhe Court notes 
that Camps Canyon Road is located on the official map of the Highway District.. ."). 
a substitute for the necessary governmental action necessary to establish public rights in 
CCR in SENE Section 15 T39NR3WBM. 
Highways in the third category [prescriptive acquisitions] will require some 
evidence showing that the road was used for a period of five years and worked 
and ltept up at the expense of the public. 
As the majority states, Idaho Code 5 20-202 does not authorize a board of 
county commissioners to adjudicate the status of any road as public or private. 
The inclusion o f a  private road on the highway map does not coustitute as 
adjudication that the road is public. 
Homestead Farms, Inc. v. B'rd of County Comm 'rs o f  Teton County, 141 Idaho 855, 11 9 
P.3d 630 (2005) Justice Eismann specially concurring Id., at 862, 119 P.3d 630,637 
Also Commissioners can not use 1.C. §40-203a to establish public rights in CCR. They 
are prohibited from doing so under their own resolutio11. See Galvin v. Canyon County 
High. Dist. No. 4, 134 Idaho 576, 579,6 P.3d 826,829 (2000) ("Section 40-203A may 
only be used to validate an existing highway or public right of way about which there is 
some kind of doubt. It does not allow for the creation of new public rights"). 
Defendants' counsel obfuscation of the legal establishment of the public interest in 
14 . . CCR 1s uldicative of the weakness of Defendants' case. Defendants are without 
evidence of either of their a ~ u a r e n t ' ~  antecedent claims-that CCR is public or that they 
can accurately identify the strip of land, as "established by user", that has been used and 
maintained for five years prior to the late fall of 2005; See D'Amato and Russell, supra. 
l 4  Defendants claims are in contradiction to one another: CCR is a public road 
(Respondents ' BrieJ; at p. 6, par. 3("Carnps Canyon Road was a public road prior to 
adoption of the official map"); and CCR is not a public road (Tr., Vol. I, p. 11 8, LL. 17- 
22 (Defendants' cou11se1 states there are no public records regarding the establishment of 
the road[CCR]). 
The District Court implies the antecedent conditions; the Defendants just list three 
public rights in CCR. 
5) it concluded that I.C.540-2312 adjudicates a 50 foot width for C C R ' ~  
I.C.540-23 12 has no provisions for coitstitutional guarantees to adjudicate public rights- 
to take land from Plaintiffs. There is no legal merit for Defendants' interpretation. See 
Cleveland Bud. Of Ed., supra. There is no reasonableness to Defendants' interpretation of 
I.C.§40-23 12 See D' Amato, supra. Defendants' policieslcustoms are invalid at their 
inception-a self contradiction of the constitutional set the law as a subset is contained 
in. See Russell. 
6) it concluded that there is case law support of a conclusion that I.C.940- 
2312 adjudicates a 50 foot width for CCR, for a public highway, for a highway 
established by user, or for a highway presently existing at a lesser width found in the 
citations of "Meseuvey [Meservey v Gullford, 14 Idaho 133, 93 P.780 (1908)] a id  its 
progeny", as the Derendants call Bentel v. Bannock County, 104 Idaho 130,656 P.2d 
1383 (1983), as a legal authority of to a cogent connection to the District Court's 
conclusion that public highways in Idaho shall not be less than fifty feet wide, including 
CCR (see Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment and 
Defendants' Motionfor Summauy Judgment R., Vol. VII, p. 1460-63, par.2). Bentel is 
about increases of use or scope of an easen~ent and does not pertain to cases, as the 
present, which concern alterations in width, length, and location. See Argosy Trust 
Through Its Truslee, Alan Andrews, and Bruce Byron Bedke, supra. 
'' Opinion and Order on Plaintgs ' Motionsjbr Partial Summary Judgment and 
Defindants ' Motion for Summary Judgment, R., Vol. VII, pp. 1460-1462, section 2. 
Public highways in Idaho shall not he less than fifty feet wide, including ... Camps 
Canyon Road); pp. 1463-1472 (the District Court concludes Defendants' activities are 
within the "right of way" and therefore grants defendants summary judgment as Plaintiffs 
have no possessory rights in the easement, at 1472, LL. 4-7. 
Meservey is entirely consistent with the statutory authority of Defendants' 
jurisdiction under I.C.§§40-1310(1) which in part reads, "The comn~issiotlers of a 
highway district have exclusive general supervision and jurisdiction over all highways 
and public rights-of-way within their highway system,. . .") and 202(3), supra. What is 
part of the NLCHD hlghway system 1s l~n~ited in the case of a prescriptive easemcnt, as 
CCR is claimed to be, and as CCR has not been laid out or located and recorded by 
orders of the commissioners, to be presumed to be 50 feet, unless that which has been 
used and maintained at the public expense has been limited by the owner, Plaintiffs, of 
said road, CCR, prior to time it became a highway by user for five years. The evidence 
of this case clearly supports the finding and conclusion that the Plaintiffs have sought to 
limit the width of CCR to that which had bee11 used and lnaintained at the pubiic expense 
for 5 years prior to the late CaLl of 2005 whether the Defendants would allow Plaintiffs an 
official hearing or not 
7) it concluded that there is a cogent or coherent connection between the 
District Court's apparent antecedent requirements of CCR is a "public highway" or 
CCR is "established by user" to conclusions of law based on 1.c.540-231217. I.C.540- 
2312 does not mention "public highways", "established by user" highways, or 25 feet 
from centerline widths. The District Court cites no authority to show "public highways" 
or "established by user" highways are other than sinlply "highways" or are given 
specialized treatment 
17 Opinion and Order on Plainliffs ' Motionsfor Partial Summary Judgment and 
Defendants' Motionfor Summary Judgment, R., Vol. VII, pp. 1461, L. 13 ("[tlhere is a 
long history in Idaho case law. ..") through p. 1462-63, L. 30- L. 3 ("[tlhe fifty foot width 
of Canlps Caxyon Road.. ."). 
8) it interpreted I.C.9 40-2314 ambiguously and under statutory construction 
when it was valid as unambiguously read. Where the statutory language is 
una~nbiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect and 
there is no occasion for this Court to consider the rules of statutory construction. See 
Payette River Property Owners Ass 'n v Bd of County Comm 'rs, 132 Idaho 55 1, 557, 
976 P.2d 477,483 (1999). The District Court reads 1.C.s 40-2314 ambiguously and 
statutorily construes and: 
a) Redefined the statutory construction of I.C.940-202(3) to include a 
new category of "highwaysu-the "right of way" land which has neither been laid out 
and recorded nor used and maintained at the public expense for five years. That is 
"highways" are "highways" and not "highways". See Russell, supra. 
b) added an encrypted statement ltnown only to the Defendants' 
counsel and the District Court, "which existed prior to 1887": The District Court 
adds statutory construction to the phrase "except those of a lesser width prese~ltly 
existing"'8. 
It is implausible to bclieve that over the last 100 years or so that the Idaho legislature had 
revised and reworded I.C.$40-2312 it would encrypt a hidden message within the clause, 
"except those [which existed prior to 18871 of a lesser width presently existing", simply 
to make possible the unconstitutional talcing of private property, at the incompetence of 
I 8 ~ h i s  statute [I.C.$40-23 121 made an exception to the fifty fool width requirement for 
highways which were of a lesser width at the time the statute was enacted in 1887. There 
is no evidence in the record before this Court that Camps Canyon Road existed prior to 
1887, thus the exception is inapplicable to this case. Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs' 
Motionsfor Partial Summary Judgment and Defindants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
R., Vol. VII, p. 1461, LL. 7-10. 
the elected official or his counsel or not, or to make the acquisition by user limited to 5 
years before 1887; 
c) interpreted "[a]ll highways ... shall be not less than fifty (50) feet 
wide..." to mean mandated. That is, "shall" is meant to be read ambiguously and as 
statutorily construed as a mandate and not to be unambiguously read, "[a]Il, that is each 
and everyone-deeded as well as prescriptive, public as well as private---of the inanimate 
objects, "highways", at some future time may reach a state of being of 50 feet wide. Note 
there is no command of co~nmissioners to widen all highways. It is almost universally 
held (or Defendants have not been shown to have supernatural powers), that even elected 
officials or authorities in charge of construction and maintenance can command an 
inanimate object to be anything it is not-as in this case, presently existing at a lesser 
width t l~an 50 feet; and/or 
d) interpreted "and may be as wide as required for proper 
construction and maintenance in the discretion of the authority in charge of the 
construction and maintenance" as not discretionary-that is any width is not 
discretionary, even though I.C.$40-2312 expressly says so.. 
9) it concluded that by statutory authority public highways in Idaho, 
including CCR shall not be less than fifty (50') feet wide. See I.C.540-23 12, 
"...except those of a lesser width presently existing. ..". By statutory authority, CCR, a 
highway, whether public or not, whether established by user or not, may exist at a lesser 
width than 50 feet. There is no well established law, at least that a reasonable person can 
understand which mandates a "highway" in Idaho be adjudicated to a minimum 50 feet 
without the statutory provisions of constitutional guarantees. Idaho Law since its earliest 
beginnings (see Annotated Idaho Code 5 40-2312, supra) has consistently adhered to the 
same principles 
"Appellants had the burden of establishing the existence of the public road 
described in the petition. They failed to prove that the road had been laid out and 
recorded as a highway by order of the board of commissioners, or that it had been 
used as such for a period of five years." 
Cox v Cox, 84 Idaho 513,518-519,373 P.2d 929,932 (1962), citing Ross v Swearingen, 
39 Idaho 35, 225 P. 1021. See also District ofColumbia v. Robinson, 180 U.S. 9219. 
(x) it denied Plaintiffs relief as a matter of law on Plaintiffs' interlocutory 
partial summary judgment motions as there was no genuine issue of material fact as 
Defendants' claimed. 
a) Genuine issues of material fact at Plaintiffs' motions for partial 
summary judgment in November 2008: (i) Plaintiffs have property rights protected by 
the 14'" Amendment in their land and their fence; (ii) Defendants do not have a legally 
acquired "right of way" laid out and recorded by orders of the commissioners; (iii) 
Defendants have made alterations in location and width to the "surface area of the 
roadway"; (iv) permit for the first Wagner driveway access permit was for a trespass, (v) 
the Defendants have not given Plaintiffs notice of encroachment, and (vi) the location and 
width of the "surface area of the roadway" is disputed-the land used and maintained at 
the public expense for five years. 
l 9  District of Columbia and I.C. 9 40-202 follow the same plan: Harewood Road was a 
p~escriptive claim as it had not been laid out and recorded therefore the width of the 
easement equaled the width of the road and the determination of the width was a matter 
properly before the jury as a matter of adverse use. There are differences in the 
prescriptive period and the legislature required the Levy to lay and record all highways in 
the District to determine the proper location and width; whereas in Idaho the 
determination of the width is left to the discretion of the authorities in charge of 
maintenance, I.C. 5 40-2312, and a statutory width may be acquired if the authorities 
choose to do so, I.C. 5 40-605. 
b) As a matter of law, 
(i). Plaintiffs partial summary judgment for liability of Defendants 
under 42 USC 9 1 9 ~ 3 ~ '  is properly granted for constitutional due process and equal 
treatment violations as there is a genuine dispute of material fact over Plaintiffs' property 
rights covered by the 14"' Amendment whether Defendants claim of public rights is for 
the prescriptive rights acquired by 5 years of use of the "surface area of the roadway" or 
for a 50 foot "right of way" mandated by Idaho law [I.C.§40-23 121 as located by the 
centerline ofL'surface area of the roadway" of CCR. In either case a dispute exists which 
prejudice Plaintiffs' substantial property rights. Plaintiffs' right to due process is 
absolute. See Piphus v Carey, 435 U.S. 247,266-267 (1978). Summary judgment is 
proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 
ilany, show that tl~ere is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law". See I.R.C.P. 56(c). Whether due 
process is due is a matter of law. Plaintiffs have a right to challenge Defendants final 
decisions ofjurisdiction prejudicing Plaintiffs' substantial rights. See I.A.R. 1 l(Q. See 
Homestead Farnzs, Inc., supra 
Defendants bear the burden of proof that they have the public rights that they 
claim-room to expand the road it can not legally expand without. See Ada County 
Ifzghtliuy Dis/ric/, supra, citing floyd, 137 Idaho at 724, 52 P.3d at 869. The moving 
party is entitled to a summary judgment whe11 the nomnoving party fails to make a 
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case 
20 Plaint$@ ' Motionfor Partial Summary6 Judgment/Adjudication ofthe Issue of the 
Cause,for Action under 42-US.C. 1983, aka filed (October 21,2008), R., Vol. 11, pp. 
387-389. 
on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Badell 1,. Beeks, 115 Idaho I 
101, 102,765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988) citing Celotex v Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 
2548, 91 L.Ed. 2d 265 (1986). The degree of accuracy is not one of approximation or 
substantially unchanged but one of minuteness. See The C~ty  of Coeur D ' Alene,supra. 
See also Roberts, supra. Even if Defendants were in November, 2008 claiming 50 foot 
"right of way" acquired by use and maintenance at the public expense for five years the 
conclusiol~ of law at whlch the District Court denied Plaintiffs rehef-that the width of 
the easement was disputed and needed to be factually determined-was sufficient finding 
to grant Plailitiffs partial summary judg~ilent. The District Court simply denied Plaintiffs 
relief as a matter of law because as a matter of law they were correct. Plaintiffs simply 
said the width of the easement needed to be factually determined before Defendants 
activities of enveloping of more land took place.21. See D'Amato, supra. 
(ii) Plaintiffs' motion" for partial sulnrnary judgmellt on the 
validity of Defendants' policyicustom for widening a prescriptive highway of less than 
fifty feet or highway presently existing at a lesser width than 50 feet was improperly 
denied on the grounds that the width of CCR (as applied) needed to be factually 
determined23. See State 1,. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197 (1 998) (a facial challenge to a 
statute or rule is purely a question of law). 
See Opinion and Order (December 8,2008), R., Vol. IV, pp.770-71, par. 3 
("[~Jpecifically, the determination of the width of the right of way of Camps Canyon 
Road must be addressed"). 
22 Plainliffss Motion (October 6,2008), R., Vol. 11, pp. 324-334. 
23 See Opinion and Order (December 8, 2008), R., Vol. IV, pp.769-770, par. 2 ("[the 
underlying issue in this case requires a factual determination of the width of the right of 
way of Camps Canyon Road"). 
(iii) Plaintiffs' motionz4 for partial summary judgment that the 
width of CCR easement was equal to the width of the road, was in dispute as the previous 
owner had given permission for the alterations in the vicinity ofthe 3+/- acre parcel and 
therefore nullified Defendants' claim of prescription in that area and in any case the 
burden of proof was on the Defend 
matter to the NLCHD for validation of the legally established public rights in CCR was 
improperly denied as the width of the easement needed to be factually detennined2'. See 
Districl qf Columbia v. Robinson, 180 U.S. 9226 
(xi) it denied Plaintiffs declaratory reliefz7 on Plaintiffs' initial interlocutory 
declaratory judgment motions 28 when there was no genuine issue of material fact- 
Plaintiffs had filed Requests for Regulatory Takings ailalysis and requested the 
Coinmissioners to validate the claimed public rights in CCR under their own resolution 
and Defendants had not responded. See I.C.@40-203a and 67-8003(3). Plaintiffs' 
requests were not "advisory". See Mushyat v. Uniled States, 219 U.S. 346, 3 1 S.Ct. 250, 
55 L.Ed. 246 (the US Supreme Court said that the plaintiffs were seeking an "advisory" 
opinion when the US legislature passed an act giving Native Americans the right to sue 
24 Plaintiffs 'Motion filed (September 19,2008) R., Vol. 11, pp. 387-389 
25 See Opinion and Order (December 8,2008), R., Vol. IV, pp.766-769, par. I ("[tlhe 
width of the easement rernains a question of material fact, thus, the Plaintiffs' inotion for 
artial summary judgment is denied"). 
'6 See footnote no. 18 
27 Opinion and Order on Plainlifl ' Motion for Declaratory ,Judgment of I.C. $40-203A 
and Plaint@' Motion,for Declaratory Judgment Under $67-8003(3j R., Vol. 11, pp. 25 1 - 
259 
28 Plaint@' Motion) (April 11,2008) R., Vol. I, pp. 68-74; and P1ainl;j.i ' Motion (April 
24,2008) R., Vol. I, pp. 176-183 (at p.258 "[tlhe first motion requires the Court to issue 
an advisory opi~lion..  [fjurther, both nlotions for declaratory judgment are appropriately 
addressed through the underlying civil action. For reasons of judicial economy, both 
motions for declaratory judgment are denied"). 
the US over previous acts which the legislature thought might be unconstitutional) 
There was no multiplicity of cases; judicial economy was to answer the collstitutional 
question immediately. See Scott v. Agricultural Products Corp, Inc., 102 Idaho 147, 149, 
627 P.2d 326,328 (1981). See Maresh, supra. Plaintiffs' alleged invasion of their land 
was a "final decision", as a physical invasion of land is a final decision by definition. See 
Sinaloa Lake Owners Association v. City ofSimi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398, - (1988) (a 
physical invasioil of land is by definition a final decision). Plaintiffs filed a tort claim 
notice within a month of Defendants "final decision" that they were not going to 
acknowledge any attempt by Plaintiffs to exhaust agency remedies. 
12) it denied Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration2? on the grounds that no 
additional facts had been added or err of Court noted3'. Plaintiffs indicated to the Court 
the Defendants had not laid out and recorded a 'right of way", that the Defendants' 
policies and assaults on Plaintiffs' propei-ty were ongoing and the physical illvasiolls were 
final decisions. Defendants refusal to exhaust agency remedies was also a final decision. 
13) it stated that public rights in CCK can he legally established by or that 
Plaintiffs can loose their property rights by acknowledging the obvious-that an 
easement, CCK, exists across Plaintiffs' land or by not denying the obvious-that 
CCR exists; whereas CCR is an unrecorded prescriptive easelnent liillited to what has 
been used and maintained for five years at the public expense3'. 
29 Plaint@' Motion and Briefto Reconsider Court's Opinion and Order on Plaint(fs8 
Motion for Declaratory Judgment of I C. $40-203A and Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Declaratory Judgmenl under $67-8003(3) R., Vol. 11, pp. 262-293 
30 Opinion and Order (September 5, 2008) R., voi. 11, pp. 307-311. 
3' Opinion and Order (May 11,2009) R., Vol. VII, pp. 1457-1460, par. A. 1. Camps 
Canyon Road is a public highway established through public use. 
Plaintiffs have simply said that CCR exists and it has so from its earliest 
beginnings essentially unchanged in location, width and length until 1996 when it was 
altered. CCR existed again unchanged ikom that 1996 alteration until the late fall of 2005 
when Defendants began again to alter the width, location and Length of CCR. At any 
time, CCR is what had been used and maintained for five years whether prior to the start 
of the alterations fro111 the late fall of 2005 or before 1996-what has been established by 
user. See 1.C.s 40-202(3). What had been "established by user" prior to 1996 (as it 
existed to the SE of where CCR was relocate in 1996 in the vicinity of the 3+1- acre 
parcel) was altered in 1996 at the permission of Mr. Swanson. The permission Mr. 
Swanson gave for the alterations (its relocated position after 1996) llullified any 
"establislment by user" in laver of a Coni~non Law Dedication in tlie vicinity of the 3+1- 
acre parcel whether Defendants conveyed and recorded the gift or not3'.  hat alteration 
also changed tlie positio~i of the 31-1- acre parcel, as no survey was recorded with the 
purchase of the parcel in 191 1 and altered the road frontage as is recorded on the 
Wagners' and Plai~itiffs' deeds. Defendants have a duty to convey and record gift 
dedications (see I.C.§40-2302) and a duty to record commissioners orders to alter a 
highway (see I.C.§40-608). 
Conclusion; Defendants' counsel attempts to downplay and distort Defendants' past and 
continued intrusions into Plaintiffs' land by i~nplying that it (see Respondenls ' Brief; at 
pp. 8-9, par. 1 1) results in only "minimal, necessary widening over time", is indicative 
not o~ily of his lack of a cogent assessment of the problems that Defendants' activities on 
32 Whatever is, is and CCR remainedstable until the late fall of2005 and the onset ofthe 
present problems. are to go unrecorded at the expense ofabutting landowners 
and allow Defendants to foment neighborly disputes as a matter of their own 
irresponsibility then Defendants need some adult leadership. 
CCR present for the Plaintiffs but also his confusion over the matters of law at hand. The 
US Supreme Court has long ago admonished the actslon~issions of a governmental 
agency in a policy of whittling away at a private asset. See U. S. v. Diekinson, 33 1 U.S. 
745, 749 (1947) ("All that we are here holding is that when the Government chooses not 
to colidenin land but to bring about a taking by a continuing process of physical events, 
the owner is not required to resort either to piecemeal or to premature litigation to 
ascertain the just compensation for what is really 'taken"'). See Kaiser Aetna v. United 
States, 444 U S .  164, 179-80, 100 S.Ct. 383, 392-93, 62 L.Ed.2d 323 (1 979) (A property 
owner's right to exclude others is "universally held to be a fundamental element of the 
property right"). See Lingle v Chei~vorz U S A ,  Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) ([tlhe 
paradigmatic talcing requiring just compensation is a direct government appropriation or 
physical invasion of private properly). Nothing in the facts, or in Defendants' policy 
forn~ulation, reveal anything about the magnitude or chavacter of the buvden Defendants 
activities impose upon Plaintiffs' property rights or the public's position on it-eminent 
domain. Id., at 548. This case is void of ally police powers issues. "LW]hat shoclts the 
conscience" (see Respondents' BrieJ at 28-30) is the deliberate indifference and callous 
disregard of the constitutional guarantees in Defendants' actions and failures to act, it is 
the constructive knowledge of the constitutional violations not the tragedy of the personal 
loss. See Countj ofSacranzento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998) citing Daniels v 
Williams, 474 U .  S., at 331 ("Historically, this guarantee of due process has been applied 
to deliberate decisions of government officials to deprive a person of life, liberty, or 
property"). 
Defendants have unlawfully occupied Plaintiffs' land for 4 going on 5 years now 
and have allowed third parties to do the same. At best, Defendants, Defendants' counsel, 
and the 2nd Judicial District of the State of Idaho have wasted Plaintiffs' time, money and 
effort in their futile and useless attempts to resolvethese matters. In sum Defendants 
have deprived Plaintiffs of their property rights without due process (substantive and 
procedural) and equal protection of the law. The Defendants and the Defendants' counsel 
have abused the process of litigation in t h ~ s  matter with their unreasonable claims without 
foundation or legal merit-their frivolous and childish antics. Defet~dants have sought an 
"advisory" opinion with their motion for summary judgment and avoidance of the 
expeditious use of a judicial review format to resolve these matters at Plaintiffs' expense 
when Defendants' counsel could have simply, at no cost, asked an opinion of the Idaho 
State's Attorney General. See 1.C.s 67-1401(2). Neither the Defendants nor Defendants' 
counsel really want the issues resolved. 
Plaintiffs seek from this Court declaratory and injunctive relief, the return of their 
wrongfully taken land, and full common law damages for these wrongful takings to be 
determined by a jury. Further Plaintiffs seek granting of Plaintiffs' motions for 
evidentiary sanctions of Defendants for their spoliation of the evidence and preparing of 
affidavits in bad faith and to allow Plaintiffs 'Lo amend their Complaint to include 
additional parties if necessary and additional damages. 
Dated this 23rd Day of February, 2010 Respectfully submitted, 
Don Nalrorson, Pro se 
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